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Section 1: Introduction
In public debate, the topic of immigration must rank among the most controversial. Within the subject of immigration, the question of whether immigrants are more or less likely to place demands on the welfare state, relative to natives, is perhaps even more controversial.
The question of immigrant welfare receipt relative to natives has motivated a number of papers within the economics literature, with most papers looking at the issue from a national perspective. Examples include Riphahn (2004) on Germany, Hansen and Lofstrom (2009) 
on
Sweden and Barrett and McCarthy (2007) on Ireland. Dustmann et al (2010) also look at this issue but in the broader context of assessing the public finance impacts of immigration into the UK 1 In this paper, we aim to look at relative rates of receipt of welfare across immigrants and natives in a European setting . 2 1 For a broad review of the literature on immigration and welfare, see Barrett and McCarthy (2008) . 2 In conducting this analysis, we are updating work by Brücker et al (2002) in which data from 1996 to 1998 was used.
. By using the trans-national European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions for 2007 (EU-SILC), we are able to assess how rates of welfare receipt for immigrants differ across countries and across payment types. If we observe that immigrants are less likely to receive welfare relative to natives, this would be consistent with a situation in which immigrants face a barrier to receiving payments or that their access is restricted in some way. It could be that they face different eligibility criteria relative to natives. It could also be that they may be unaware of their entitlements. At a more troubling level, to the extent that welfare receipt is dependent upon discretionary decisions of government officials, lower rates of receipt of welfare receipt among immigrants could be consistent with discrimination. Yet another possibility is that immigrants could be less likely to make claims, if they think that this is in some sense unacceptable in, what is for them, a host country. By extension, if we find no such differential rates of receipt, then concerns on these points are lowered.
We consider the issue using both raw data (Section 2) and regression analysis (Section 3) and generally find very little evidence of higher rates of receipt among immigrants when all payments are considered together. We also look at relative rates of poverty among immigrants and natives and find evidence of higher rates of poverty among immigrants in many countries. When combined with the results on welfare receipt, this raises a question over the effectiveness of welfare systems in protecting immigrants from poverty across Europe.
Section 2: The unadjusted view
In this section we simply compare the proportions of immigrants and natives who receive welfare payments, across countries and across different types of supports. In Section 3 below we consider the question of relative rates of receipt in a multivariate regression context, recognising that differences in these proportions could be the result of differences in socioeconomic characteristics. In so doing, we address the question of whether rates of receipt differ controlling for these socio-economic characteristics. In both Section 2 and 3 we use The instrument has also been implemented in Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and in Switzerland as from 2007. Implementation in Croatia is being discussed.
The instrument aims to provide two types of data:
• Cross-sectional data pertaining to a given time or a certain time period with variables on income, poverty, social exclusion and other living conditions • Longitudinal data pertaining to individual-level changes over time, observed periodically over, typically, a four year period.
Social exclusion and housing condition information is collected at household level while labour, education and health information is obtained for persons aged 16 and over. The core of the instrument, income at very detailed component level, is mainly collected at personal level but a few components are included in the household part of SILC."
Before looking at the question of supports, we first look at the proportions of immigrants living in countries across Europe. We should point out at this stage that we imposed a rule whereby only countries with at least 100 immigrants are included, so as to ensure that the figures produced later are based on a reasonably sized sample of immigrants. Although our definition of an immigrant is a person who was not born in their current country of residence, most countries identify two groups of foreign-born people -those who were born within the European Union and those born outside of European Union. Hence in our country surveys we distinguish between EU and non-EU immigrants and we present all findings by looking at these two groups separately. The one exception is Germany. We can only identify foreignborn people and not whether they come from within or outside the European Union. In all the figures we show the result for Germany; however it should be noted that the information presented refers to all foreign-born. In Figure 1 we show the proportions of non-European Union and European Union immigrants across the countries. In this figure and in subsequent ones, we rank the countries according to the proportion of non-European Union immigrants. According to the EU-SILC data, Austria has the highest proportion of non-European Union immigrants. It is generally the case that the number of non-European Union immigrants exceeds that of EU immigrants, with the exceptions to this being Luxembourg, Ireland, Iceland and the Czech Republic.
We now turn to the question of social supports. We begin by looking at a range of social supports combined. These are payments related to the following circumstances:
unemployment, sickness, disability and old-age, and payments related to having children. At this stage we are considering all individuals in the adult population. In Figure 2 and the Ratios that exceed one imply that the proportion of immigrants is higher than the proportion of natives; the opposite holds for ratios below one.
In presenting the ratios we rank the countries so that the first country has the highest ratio for non-EU immigrants relative to natives. The ratio in respect on EU immigrants is also shown for each country. Where a white bar appears, this means that there was not a statistically significant difference between the relevant proportions. 
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the ratio in respect of EU immigrants and natives also exceeds one. This is somewhat unusual across the countries, with the Czech Republic being the only other country where EU immigrants are seen to have a higher rate of social support receipt relative to natives.
From Figure 2 we can see that lower rates of receipt for immigrants relative to natives are more typical across the countries. Of the nineteen countries listed (excluding Germany), rates of receipt are lower (and statistically so) for non-EU immigrants in nine. For a further five countries, there is no statistically significant difference between rates of receipt for non-EU immigrants and natives. A similar pattern holds in respect of EU immigrants, with lower or statistically equivalent rates of receipt being more prevalent. In Figure 3 , we begin to look at supports in a more disaggregated way -in particular we look at rates of receipt by types of support. The ratios shown in Figure 3 are based on receipt of unemployment related supports. Given the nature of these payments, we restrict our analysis to individuals of working age. over one imply higher rates of support receipt for immigrants relative to natives, there appears to be a stronger tendency for higher rates of receipt of unemployment supports among non-EU immigrants. Across the 19 countries, 12 countries show ratios above one for non-EU immigrants; a further two also have ratios above one, but these are not statistically significant. In the case of Norway, Finland and Iceland, the ratio exceeds two. We turn next to sickness and disability supports. When calculating these ratios, we only examine the working age population on the basis that people aged over 65 are more likely to The last set of support to be considered is the one given when children are present in the household. Given the structure of the data, we are not necessarily looking at the parents of children in the household; all we can say is that we know for each individual if there are children in the household and if family-related supports are paid into the household also. For these supports we revert to looking at the entire populations of immigrants and natives. The ratios are shown in Figure 6 , and the broad picture that emerges is one of higher rates of These ratios are interesting but they also point to a potentially simple explanation for immigrants/native differences: namely higher numbers of children in immigrant households.
Below we explore this more fully when we move onto the regression-based analysis.
Before leaving this section on descriptive analysis, it is useful to look at another set of ratios but this time with a focus on risk of poverty as opposed to rates of receipt of supports. We calculated what proportion of immigrants and natives live in households in which income is Figure 7 appears to reveal a general tendency for non-EU immigrants to face a higher risk of poverty than natives across a broad range of countries. The ratio is below one in just two cases -Poland and Portugal. Twelve countries show ratios greater than one, where proportion differences are statistically significant. In six of those twelve countries, the ratio is higher than 2, and in two -Luxembourg and Sweden -the ratio is higher than 3. For immigrants from within the European Union, the general tendency is also for higher rates of being at risk of poverty relative to natives. Only in Poland and Cyprus is there clear evidence of the poverty risk being lower for European Union immigrants relative to natives. The ratios are typically lower for European Union immigrants when compared with the non-European
Union immigrants/native ratios but are generally greater than one. Before presenting the regression results, it is useful to present some data on the relative characteristics of immigrants and natives across the countries in question. As is the case above, we present information on the characteristics in terms of ratios. In Figure 8 we examine the average ages of immigrant and native populations. Ratios greater than one imply that immigrants are older, on average, relative to natives; ratios less than one imply the opposite. We have not presented measures of statistical significance. As a second element in this assessment of how the immigrant and native populations differ in terms of characteristics, we look at educational qualifications. Although the data contain information on a number of educational categories, we have chosen to focus on one category to make the presentation of the data more accessible. In Figure 9 we construct ratios based on the proportion on immigrants and native who report having completed "post-secondary or tertiary education." In this way we focus on the higher end of the educational distributional and assess the relative qualifications of immigrant and native populations from this perspective. 
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Looking across the figure and focussing on the non-European Union immigrants, there appear to be three groups of countries. From Ireland through Finland, the non-European Union immigrants have higher levels of educational attainment relative to natives. We take Finland to be part of this group as its ratio is over 1.1. From the Netherlands through Spain, the ratio is between 1.1 and 0.9, and so these countries can be thought of as having similar As the immigrant populations are generally younger than the native populations, we would expect them to have lower amounts of labour market experience also. This is seen in Figure The fourth and final characteristic that we will look at it number of children. As many countries provide welfare benefits based on the presence and number of children, it is clear that this could be a significant determinant of differences across immigrants and natives in terms of welfare receipt. In Figure 11 we show the ratios of the average number of children across immigrants and natives. As can be seen, it is generally the case that immigrants from outside the EU have higher numbers of children. The ratio is higher than 1.1 for the first six In the regression results presented below, we reconsider the question of the relative rates of receipt of supports across immigrants and natives, controlling for relevant factors. In the following figures, we present results from these regressions in the following way. We show the estimated marginal impact of being an immigrant on the likelihood of receiving social supports, having controlled for gender, age, education and the number of children in each individuals household. The regressions used are probit regressions, as this approach is typically used in situations where the dependent variable is binary in nature, i.e. the person either did or did not receive a payment. As before we rank the countries in terms of the estimated marginal impacts for non-European Union immigrants. 
BE ES DK FR NO FI IT SE UK NL CZ DE* AT LU IS PT GR CY PL IE Non-EU EU
Our first regression includes all individuals in the sample and we include the receipt of all the same payments as considered in Figure 2 above, i.e. unemployment, sickness, disability and old-age, and child-related payments. The estimated marginal effects are shown in Figure 12 .
As was the case with the ratios in Figure 2 -7 above, white bars imply non-statistically significant results. In Figure 14 we look at old age support, having restricted the analysis to those aged over 65. showing a greater likelihood to be in receipt of old age support. The final set of support considered is family-related payments. The results from this regression are show in Figure 15 , and the degree of clarity that was apparent in Figure 14 (old age supports) is present once again. With only one exception, and where results are statistically significant, immigrants are less likely to be in receipt of family-related payments.
France is the only exception: non-European Union immigrants are 2.5% more likely to receive such supports.
We have now examined all types of support, but there are two remaining issues that are worthy of consideration. We are generally finding that immigrants (especially those from non-European Union countries) are either as likely or less likely to be in receipt of support relative to natives. Two questions that arise are the following. First, to the extent that social supports are supposed to keep people out of poverty, are the lower rates of receipt among immigrants associated with higher risks of poverty? Second, are rates of receipt among immigrants lower even when we restrict our attention to groups of immigrants and natives who might be similar in terms of eligibility for benefits?
We touched on the question of poverty in Figure 7 above where proportions of immigrants and natives at risk of poverty are examined without controlling for any socio-economic factors. In Figure 16 we show the estimated marginal impacts having controlled for age, 
Section 4: Summary and conclusions
In summary the descriptive analysis suggests that across all social support payments, there is generally little evidence that immigrants are excessive users relative to natives. Immigrants are more likely to be in receipt of unemployment related supports in a wide range of countries and also of family-related payments. They are less likely to receive old age payments and sickness/disability payments. However, the most clear-cut result to emerge from this element of the analysis was the greater likelihood of immigrants being in poverty. The picture that emerges from Figure 7 is striking in that it shows a clear and unambiguous pattern of poverty risk among immigrants that exceeds that of natives. 
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Echoing what was found in Section 2, but to a stronger degree, the broad conclusion to be drawn from the regression analysis is that there is little evidence of excessive receipt of support by immigrants relative to natives, where "excessive" is defined as higher rates of receipt whether adjusting for socio-economic characteristics or not. To the extent that higher rates of receipt are present, they appear to be restricted to unemployment support; but even in this case, this only applies in a restricted number of countries. But as with the analysis in
Section 2, what is perhaps more striking are the higher rates of poverty among immigrants.
Given the higher rates of poverty and the lower rates of welfare receipt, the questions that arises are whether welfare systems are failing to protect immigrants and if so, why. These are clearly important issues and deserving of further discussion and analysis. To a certain extent, the focus in much of the popular discussion of immigrants and welfare has been on concerns about excessive use on the part of immigrants and this may have distracted from the bigger policy concern apparent here. If welfare systems are indeed failing to protect immigrants, this has implications for labour market outcomes and for the intergenerational transmission of disadvantage.
